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INTRODUCTION
I know what you are thinking. Of all the things that can conceiva-
bly happen in this field, the least likely (the very least likely) is that
Congress will take a fresh look at federal habeas corpus for state pris-
oners. It was only in 1996 that Congress enacted the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),' which ostensibly "re-
formed" the scheme by which prisoners employ federal habeas to
challenge state criminal convictions or sentences. 2 Passing a bill of
this magnitude is no small feat. Once such legislation receives ap-
proval from both houses of Congress and the President, no one has
any appetite to resume a political battle that, for good or ill, the en-
acted statute has resolved. Realistically, the habeas law we currently
have is the habeas law we are going to have for the foreseeable fu-
ture.3 Nevertheless, in this academic setting I have a certain warrant,
t Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I would like to thank John
Blume, Winston Bowman, Krikor Dekermenjian, Eric Freedman, William Kaleva, Ramon
Tabtiang, and my second-year seminar students at the University of Hawaii for their help
with this Article.
I Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.).
2 See, e.g., Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "[t]he enact-
ment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ... created a tumultu-
ous sea change in federal habeas review, especially affecting the petitions of state
prisoners" (citation omitted)). I mean in this Article to deal exclusively with federal adju-
dication of claims that were or might have been litigated previously in the course of state
criminal proceedings.
3 I do not overlook bills pending in this Congress that would amend AEDPA in vari-
ous ways. See, e.g., Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, H.R. 3035, 109th Cong.
(2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109-
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even a responsibility, to set political realism aside. That is what I mean
to do.
In Part I, I contend that the ordinary reasons for letting new legis-
lation lie do not apply where AEDPA is concerned. The circum-
stances in which this statute was adopted defy any serious expectation
that it may yet work if given the chance. The federal habeas system is
in chaos; this is not an occasion for deferred maintenance.
In Part II, I argue that we (or most of us) agree that inferior fed-
eral courts should have authority to entertain challenges to state crim-
inal judgments. We should both acknowledge this consensus and
understand why it exists. I offer two explanations: We think federal
jurisdiction is needed largely because state courts are not institution-
ally positioned to enforce federal procedural safeguards in criminal
cases and also because states make a poor fist of providing competent
legal representation to indigent defendants. Consequently, we agree
(or ought to agree) that federal adjudication should serve two func-
tions. First, if state courts do determine the merits of federal claims at
trial or on direct review, inferior federal courts should ensure that
their judgments come reasonably close to the mark. Second, if state
courts do not determine the merits of federal claims, federal courts
should ensure that they have sufficient reasons for failing to do so.
In Part III, I describe how we might set about establishing a better
system to achieve the ends of federal adjudication. In that connec-
tion, I propose that we can revisit these problems with profit only if we
disentangle our analysis from related quarrels over capital punish-
ment. I know this proposal seems unrealistic, but I insist (in this in-
dulgent setting) that the death penalty skews sound thinking about
the basic structural arrangements that should be put in place. With
capital punishment cases out of the picture, we can think clearly about
the form that a revised framework should take.
I propose adopting a scheme that sits halfway between the collat-
eral review model we have and the appellate model others have sug-
gested. Within this hybrid system, federal courts would have
jurisdiction to review state court judgments regarding federal claims,
but they would be authorized to overturn only state determinations
that are unreasonable, not merely erroneous. State convicts would be
required to seek direct review in state court before approaching the
federal courts, but they would no longer be asked to exhaust state
postconviction avenues before advancing their federal claims. Federal
cong-bills&docid=f:s1088is.txt.pdf. However, those initiatives reflect no serious rethinking
of fundamentals. They would eliminate habeas corpus jurisdiction in many instances, sub-
ject to extremely narrow exceptions of little practical significance. Where they would allow
federal courts to operate, they would perpetuate and aggravate complex procedural ar-
rangements that frustrate efficiency or anything like efficiency.
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courts would not reinforce state procedural bar regimes. Existing
doctrine for default cases would be abandoned in favor of more flexi-
ble arrangements drawn from older federal practice. Indigent prison-
ers who wish to proceed in federal court would have access to lawyers
to prepare their claims. But they would not be allowed more than one
chance to appear in federal court. Under the hybrid model, multiple
actions by a single prisoner would come to an end, subject to certain
exceptional circumstances in which habeas corpus would remain
available.
I
BEEN THERE, DONE THAT
There usually are perfectly sound reasons for leaving recently es-
tablished arrangements alone. New legislation may be no better than
the sausage factory that produced it. Regardless, we dare hope it em-
bodies the considered policy choices of the prevailing majority.
Where that is true, we should scarcely be surprised if the vanquished
minority is displeased; political losers, after all, are not supposed to
like the innovations they resisted in the first instance. Sometimes, we
may be so ambitious as to hope that the provisions of an elaborate
new statute may fit together in a coherent plan that would be compro-
mised if any of its component parts were adjusted. Perhaps more
often (or so we like to think), complex legislation is not simply
rammed down the throats of minority members, but rather represents
a compromise or set of compromises between contending policies.
The legislative language in a recent enactment has been vetted in
drafting and mark-up sessions in which participants with varying
points of view worked together toward a sensible, politically accept-
able conclusion. The resulting package may not be perfect, or even
close to perfect. It may, in fact, be very far from perfect. Yet for the
moment it is the best we can do in our untidy democracy, and there is
no reason to think we can do any better by trying again any time soon.
Certainly, if a complex statutory package genuinely reflects a constel-
lation of political deals, we should not expect that it will operate with
the efficiency that an ideologically pure enactment might achieve.
In this instance, however, there is no basis for any of these com-
monplace explanations for leaving well enough alone. The story is
familiar, so I will only sketch the outlines.4 For years, many Republi-
cans and some Democrats supported bills to restrict federal habeas. 5
The point of their efforts was to keep death row prisoners from using
4 See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381
(1996) [hereinafter Yackle, Primer]; Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2331 (1993) [hereinafter Yackle, Hagioscope].
5 See Yackle, Primer, supra note 4, at 422-43.
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the writ to avoid or postpone execution.6 Most Republican bills would
have established new procedural requirements for all state prisoners
to meet in order to put the merits of their claims before federal
courts. 7 When those bills foundered, the Supreme Court took matters
into its own hands without benefit of any change in the habeas stat-
utes.8 In the main, the Court also established procedural hurdles for
prisoners to clear, ostensibly keeping federal habeas from frustrating
competing state interests in law enforcement and the finality of judg-
ments.9 The result was time-consuming and expensive federal litiga-
tion over satellite matters that had little or nothing to do either with
enforcing federal rights or with accommodating legitimate state con-
cerns. 10 In point of fact, finality became a more elusive goal than it
had been before the Court tried to hasten its coming.
The best illustrations are the Court's adjustments to the exhaus-
tion doctrine and the related rules regarding procedural default in
state court. Previously, prisoners were asked to defer federal habeas
petitions in order to keep federal courts from interfering with ongo-
ing state criminal proceedings." By dint of Rehnquist Court deci-
sions, however, prisoners are obliged to exhaust all available state
avenues for litigating federal claims in order to allow state courts the
opportunity to correct their own errors. 12 In consequence, prisoners
not only must press their claims at trial and on direct review, but often
must engage in state postconviction proceedings-some of the most
6 See Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 4, at 2352.
7 See Yackle, Primer, supra note 4, at 423-26.
8 See Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 4, at 2353, 2367-68.
9 See id. at 2368.
10 See infta notes 11-15.
11 SeeEx parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 250-51, 254 (1886) (disallowing a habeas petition
that would have disrupted an upcoming trial in state court).
12 My personal favorites are Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), and Edwards v.
Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000). In Carrier, the Court explained that a prisoner who wants to
press a claim that state courts declined to consider because of procedural default usually
must demonstrate "cause" for the failure to comply with state procedural rules. See Carrier,
477 U.S. at 485. The Court allowed that defense counsel mistakes can constitute cause but
only if counsel's behavior was ineffective in the constitutional sense. See id. at 488. But
since an argument that counsel's conduct was ineffective counts as a constitutional claim,
the prisoner is obliged by the exhaustion doctrine to present that independent Sixth
Amendment claim to the state courts in order to put himself in a position to argue in
federal court that counsel's service was constitutionally flawed-not as a claim for federal
habeas relief, but as the basis for finding cause for procedural default with respect to the
underlying claim the prisoner wishes to pursue. See id. at 488-89. Then, in Carpenter, the
Court held that if there is no remaining state avenue by which to present the ineffective-
assistance claim to the state courts, the prisoner must establish cause for failing to raise that
claim in state court, thus to put himself in position to ask the federal court to find coun-
sel's performance ineffective, and thus finally to put himself in position to litigate the un-
derlying claim. See Carpenter, 529 U.S. at 452-53.
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obscure and Byzantine processes known to American law.13 If at any
point along the way a prisoner fails to advance a claim in the manner
specified by state law, he very likely forfeits not only the opportunity to
litigate the merits in state court, but also the chance for federal habeas
adjudication.1 4 The Court's doctrine for procedural default cases is
demonstrably problematic for reasons I examine later.1 5
In time, the Justices sought bigger game on two fronts. First,
Chief Justice Rehnquist formed a committee of the Judicial Confer-
ence, chaired by former Justice Powell, to propose legislation for
death penalty cases.1 6 The Powell Committee, in turn, recommended
especially state-friendly procedures in capital cases on the condition
that the states provide indigent prisoners with effective counsel in
state postconviction proceedings.1 7 Second, the Court adopted the
Teague doctrine' 8 (another matter that I will defer for the moment).
Meanwhile, Republican legislative initiatives also went beyond proce-
dural restrictions to the substance of federal court authority.1 9 In par-
ticular, some bills contained provisions that would have barred federal
courts from entertaining claims that had been fully and fairly adjudi-
cated in state court.20 Democratic leaders resisted procedural restric-
tions as onerous and viewed the "full and fair" plan as an effort to
abrogate habeas corpus for state convicts altogether. 21 In time, Demo-
crats countered with their own bills meant to make federal habeas
more accessible to state convicts, including prisoners facing death.22
At that point, the legislative battle over habeas corpus was more
clearly than ever a fight about capital punishment.23
The stalemate was broken by a confluence of events, two in par-
ticular. In 1994, Republicans achieved working majorities in both
houses of Congress, and in 1995 the Oklahoma City bombing excited
calls for congressional action to combat "terrorism."24 The stage was
13 See Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row,
37 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 530-53 (1988); Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 4, at 2366.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 101-04.
15 See infra Part III.C.
16 See Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 4, at 2367.
17 SeeAD Hoc COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, REPORT AND PRo-
POSAL (1989), reprinted in HABEAS CORPUS LEGISLATION: HEARINGS ON H.R. 4737, H.R. 1090,
H.R. 1953 & H.R. 3584 BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 101ST
CONGRESS 45-68 (1990).
18 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300-01 (1989).
19 See Yackle, Primer, supra note 4, at 426-27.
20 See, e.g., S. 2216, 97th Cong. § 5 (1982).
21 See Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 4, at 2362-64.
22 See, e.g., H.R. 5269, 101st Cong. (1990).
23 SeeYackle, Hagioscope, supra note 4, at 2357-76, 2416-23.
24 See Terrell J. Iandiorio, Federal Postconviction Relief and 28 U.S. C. § 2255(4): Are State
Court Decisions "Facts"?, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1141, 1147 (2004).
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set for a common legislative drama. It was clear that some "antiterror-
ism" bill was going to pass and that anything wedged into that bill
would pass with it. Republican leaders seized the opportunity finally
to limit the federal courts' authority in habeas corpus-not, of course,
exclusively in cases in which petitioners are charged with acts of "ter-
rorism," but in ordinary cases in which prisoners use habeas to chal-
lenge criminal convictions or sentences.2 5
The drafting work fell to staff lawyers serving the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Those drafters did not simply select a prior bill as their
model. Nor did they start afresh. The occasion was ripe for anything,
and they emptied the committee files of virtually all the restrictive pro-
posals that came to hand. That included many of the procedural re-
quirements that Republicans had tried to impose on all convicts, as
well as the bargain the Powell Committee had proposed to offer states
with respect to prisoners under sentence of death: even tighter proce-
dural restrictions on federal habeas in exchange for appointed coun-
sel at the postconviction stage of state proceedings. The drafters
chose not to revive the "full-and-fair" proposal. That would have pro-
voked members who had voted against it in the past.26 Instead, they
drew up a new provision, the now-familiar § 2254(d), by which they
hoped to accomplish much the same thing and, into the bargain, cap-
ture the essence of Teague.27
The drafters and their masters kept their own counsel. They con-
ducted no significant discussions with minority counsel or others over
policy, far less over particular language. They submitted to no com-
mittee hearings, mark-up sessions, or similar opportunities for testing
ideas. Instead, they collected all these disparate elements, framed
them in language they considered to be effective, and attached them
to the fast-moving vehicle the antiterrorism bill supplied. In the end,
habeas accounted for two titles-one containing cut-and-paste amend-
ments to existing habeas provisions in Chapter 153 of Title 28, the
other containing a new Chapter 154 housing adaptations of the Pow-
ell Committee's program. The bill shot through committee in both
bodies and went to the floor without an explanatory report. The floor
debates were extensive, but scarcely rigorous. The bill was adopted by
main force, and President Clinton signed it into law (though perhaps
dubitante) .28
25 See DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFIC-
ING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 114 (2002).
26 See Yackle, Primer, supra note 4, at 435-36.
27 See id. at 382-83.
28 See id. at 438-43.
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Mark Tushnet and I once argued that AEDPA essentially en-
dorsed what the Court itself had already set in train. 29 At least, the
Court might have used the occasion provided by new legislation to
shape things into a more sensible form-integrating new statutory
provisions into existing decisional law, identifying and reconciling dis-
cernible rationales, and blending everything together into a more co-
herent system. That has not happened. As construed by the Court,
AEDPA not only failed to reduce the procedural complications the
Court's decisions had introduced, but perpetuated the problems the
Court had created and even manufactured more. The reason, in part,
is that AEDPA is replete with tensions that defy resolution through
pragmatic judicial construction.
Consider, for example, that the procedural rules established for
all cases, capital and noncapital alike, frustrate the Powell Commit-
tee's scheme to give states incentives for supplying indigent death row
prisoners with postconviction counsel. Nearly ten years later, not a
single state has established a program for appointing counsel suffi-
cient to bring Chapter 154 into play. 30 The explanation is plain
enough: Lawyers are expensive. Given that the amended provisions in
Chapter 153 already give states much of what they might get by invok-
ing Chapter 154, states are not inclined to spend significant public
treasure to gain a little more. The best example is § 2244(d) (1) of the
Act, which establishes a one-year filing period for all prisoners. 31 With
that filing deadline in place, states are not willing to pony up fees for
counsel in state postconviction proceedings merely to trigger the 180-
day filing period in § 2263(a) of Chapter 154.32 We are left with an
entire chapter of the United States Code, all dressed up with nowhere
to go.
There is also tension between the numerous procedural provi-
sions in AEDPA, on the one hand, and § 2254(d), on the other. The
procedural rules suggest that Congress is content that state convicts
should be able to present federal claims to the federal courts, but con-
cerned that some petitioners are not in earnest and might file federal
petitions simply to harass state authorities or, in the case of death row
inmates, to postpone execution. 33 Congress's objective, then, is to
29 See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DuKEa L.J.
1 (1997). I still think, by the way, that we would be better off now if the Court had taken
that view of the matter. Then again, it is not as though knowledgeable congressional lead-
ers fully appreciated the bandwagon they were climbing aboard.
30 But see Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta that Ari-
zona's scheme measures up), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 977 (2002).
31 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1) (2000).
32 See id. § 2263(a).
33 The Conference Committee Report explains AEDPA's purposes as follows: "This
title incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to
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bring discipline to the system-to make habeas petitioners litigate
quickly and efficiendy. By contrast, § 2254(d) signifies that Con-
gress's concerns go not to the inefficiency of habeas litigation, but to
the substance of federal court authority. The objective, then, is to
prevent federal courts from awarding relief even when petitioners
press their claims assiduously. Of course, Congress may want both to
make prisoners turn square procedural corners and to circumscribe
the relief they ultimately stand to win. Still, two quite different con-
ceptions of habeas-and the problems habeas presents-appear to be
at work. The manner in which AEDPA was cobbled together suggests
that no one thought any of this through at a conceptual level.
The explanation may be, again, that the drafters meant to codify
doctrinal innovations the Court had already adopted, and § 2254(d)
was their way of capturing the Teague doctrine. 34 Mark Tushnet and I
predicted that the Court would read § 2254(d) essentially to track the
explanation of Teague that Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy of-
fered in their concurring opinions in Wright v. West.35 Justice Stevens
took that position, more or less, in Williams v. Taylor.36 But Justice
O'Connor's controlling account of § 2254(d) signaled a different ap-
proach.37 More recently, the Court has explained that Teague and
§ 2254(d) are separate ideas and, in cases in which both are engaged,
must be implemented seriatim. 38 Initially, a habeas court must deter-
mine whether Teague allows a claim to be entertained at all.39 If so
(and the claim is meritorious), the court must decide independently
whether § 2254(d) allows the award of federal habeas relief.
This treatment of § 2254(d) illustrates another factor in the curi-
ous mix that is now federal habeas corpus law. The Supreme Court
will not countenance the idea that any part of AEDPA incorporates
prior law. The Justices apparently think that if they read anything in
AEDPA in that way, they will be charged with denying the new Act any
operative effect and thus frustrating congressional will. There may be
something to the familiar canard that every statute must have some
meaning. But Congress often enacts legislation for the straightfor-
ward purpose of codifying or lightly modifying extant judge-made
address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases." H.R. REP. No.
104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
34 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300-01 (1989).
35 See 505 U.S. 277, 303-04 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "the stan-
dard for determining when a case establishes a new rule is 'objective,' and the mere exis-
tence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new"); id. at 306-08
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that "Teag u e did not establish a deferential standard of
review of state-court decisions of federal law"); Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 29, at 42.
36 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting on this point).
37 See id. at 399 (O'Connor, J., majority opinion on this point).
-38 See Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam).
39 See id.
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doctrine rather than forging some significant change. It is far from
clear that each and every provision in AEDPA must alter the state of
affairs ex ante. In this instance, it makes little sense to insist that
§ 2254(d) and Teague are distinct and must operate independently in
the same case, the one following the other.
Recall that Teague usually bars federal habeas courts from consid-
ering claims that depend on new rules of federal law.40 The ostensible
idea at work is equity.4 1 When the Supreme Court announces a novel
proposition of law, fairness requires that the new rule should benefit
not only the individual in the case at hand, but also others similarly
situated. If the immediate case is in an appellate posture, the new
rule should apply to all other petitioners or potential petitioners
whose convictions are not yet final because they are still subject to
direct review. If the immediate case is in a collateral posture (e.g., it
reaches the Court by means of a habeas corpus petition), the new rule
should benefit the (much larger) number of prisoners whose convic-
tions are already final in the sense they are not open to direct review.
The Court is content that new rules should benefit everyone still in
the direct-review pipeline, but usually is unwilling to extend novel
rules to convicts who are not.42 Accordingly, the Court typically bars
new-rule claims from habeas corpus in order to avoid creating new
rules in that posture and, concomitantly, upsetting numerous previ-
ous convictions. 43
The Teague doctrine addresses the threshold question whether a
claim can be entertained in a federal habeas petition at all.44 As the
Court tends to put it, a claim is not cognizable if it rests on a "new"
rule of law. 45 Or to put it the other way, only a claim based on an
"old" rule need apply. A rule is old in the necessary sense only if, at
the time the petitioner's conviction became final on direct review, the
rule already existed in a form that "dictated" a result favorable to the
prisoner, such that a state court judgment against him was or would
have been "patently unreasonable. '46 Understand, then, that the defi-
40 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989).
41 See id. at 304, 316.
42 See id. at 304-05.
43 See id. at 310.
44 See id. at 300.
45 See id. at 310.
46 See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 422 (1990) (Brennan J., dissenting); Teague,
489 U.S. at 301. Even as the Court's general definitions of new and old rules for Teague
purposes are fact-sensitive, there are instances in which the Justices take more abstractly
articulated doctrine as the baseline. In cases in which prisoners argue that they were de-
nied effective representation in state court, for example, the Court routinely assumes with-
out discussion that the doctrine announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984), counts as an old rule, apart from the application of that doctrine to the circum-
stances. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000). It may be that the Court
treats Strickland in that way because ineffective assistance claims characteristically are con-
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nition of an old rule on which a habeas petitioner can rely embodies a
"reasonableness" test. A claim can be considered only if it rests on a
rule of law that admitted only one reasonable result when the pris-
oner was still in the direct review channel-namely, a decision in the
prisoner's favor. Once a prisoner advances such a claim, § 2254(d)
governs the federal court's authority to provide a remedy. If a state
court previously rejected a claim on the merits, § 2254(d) usually per-
mits federal relief only if the state court's decision reflects an "unrea-
sonable" application of an old rule. 47
You see where this is going. By the time § 2254(d) comes into
play, the federal court has already decided, for Teague purposes, that a
state court acted or would have acted unreasonably in reaching ajudg-
ment against the prisoner when the case was still subject to direct re-
view. If that were not true, the claim would not depend on an old
rule, and it would never have made it through the door. It makes no
sense, then, to read § 2254(d) to permit an award of habeas relief only
if a state court unreasonably applied an old rule. That construction
makes federal relief available only if a state court performed unrea-
sonably on two independent levels. On one level, the state court must
have acted unreasonably by rejecting a claim in the teeth of a rule of
law that compelled a judgment for the prisoner. That's Teague. On
another level, the state court must have acted unreasonably, again, by
unreasonably applying that very rule of law (from which, by hypothe-
sis, the court unreasonably departed in the first place). That's
§ 2254(d). 48 To put it yet another way, the Court's account of Teague
and § 2254(d) renders the latter unintelligible. The Teague doctrine
makes a claim cognizable only if a state court acted unreasonably in
rejecting it, thus eliminating the possibility that § 2254(d) might bar
habeas relief on the ground that a state court determined a cogniza-
ble claim reasonably.49
sidered only in a collateral posture. Cf Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05
(2003) (holding that federal convicts should press claims of this kind in postconviction
proceedings). It wouldn't do, then, to limit habeas to Strickland claims that state courts
unreasonably rejected in light of the peculiar facts of each case in turn. Since Strickland
claims typically don't reach the Court in a direct review posture, there is no other occasion
on which to enforce Strickland forthrightly or perhaps to adjust the doctrine that Strickland
originally created.
47 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
48 I should say this makes no sense to me. Nor can I be made to understand it. Read-
ers should know that I contended against this account of Teague and § 2254(d) in an ami-
cus brief for the ACLU in Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004). See Brief Amici Curiae of the
American Civil Liberties Union et al., Beard, 542 U.S. 406 (No. 02-1603).
49 I emphasize that this is true only in cases in which both Teague and § 2254(d) are
implicated-the former because the respondent asserts that a claim is Teague-barred, the
latter because a state court previously adjudicated the claim on the merits. The same intel-
lectual difficulty does not arise if only one of the two, Teague or § 2254(d), is in play.
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There are occasions when AEDPA itself acknowledges related or
competing policies and attempts to reconcile them. Still, the results
have not been pretty. I frankly think the drafters failed to understand
the ideas they were charged to accommodate and then compounded
their substantive errors with poor craftsmanship. I don't mean to be
unkind here. In all fairness, the drafters faced monumental difficul-
ties and worked in isolation. I'm glad I wasn't asked to sit alone at my
desk and come up with language to capture and own this body of
interlocking material. But even allowing for a fair measure of
humility, the work product here is not just bad. It is demonstrably,
unquestionably, and unforgivably bad. Illustrations abound.
Consider the balance that must be struck between two familiar
desiderata. On the one hand, we want to discourage prisoners from
rushing into federal court before state courts have had an opportunity
to correct their own federal mistakes. 5 0 To that end, the exhaustion
doctrine requires prisoners to pursue available state avenues for liti-
gating federal claims in advance of federal habeas litigation. 5 1 On the
other hand, we want to encourage prisoners to initiate federal actions
as soon as they can to ensure that issues are adjudicated before the
record becomes colder than it already is and, into the bargain, com-
press the time required to bring matters to a conclusion.52 These two
policies run into each other. The one contemplates slowing things
down, the other speeding things up.53
Everyone recognized this problem prior to AEDPA. In 1977, the
Judicial Conference proposed and Congress approved Rule 9(a) of
the Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings, 54 which authorized a federal
habeas court to dismiss a petition if, because of undue delay, a respon-
dent's ability to respond was prejudiced. 55 I suspect the Judicial Con-
ference doubted that fixed filing deadlines were needed. After all,
convicts serving terms of imprisonment have no reason to put off a
process that might open their cell doors. Certainly, the Conference
recognized that precise filing periods are hard to formulate and
harder to implement.5 6 The procedural vehicles for pressing federal
claims in state court are notoriously complex. So it's difficult to say
when, in the circumstances of a particular case, a firm filing period
should begin and how, once it begins, its duration should be calcu-
50 See Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1731, 1735 (2000)
[hereinafter Yackle, Figure].
51 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Yackle, Figure, supra note 50, at 1735.
52 SeeYackle, Figure, supra note 50, at 1736.
53 See id. at 1735-36.
54 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(a) (2000).
55 See Yackle, Figure, supra note 50, at 1736.
56 See id.
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lated.57 Accordingly, the Conference chose instead a comparatively
flexible approach akin to laches.58
The proponents of AEDPA plainly thought Rule 9(a) was inade-
quate to discourage late filings. So they substituted a hard-and-fast
filing period, running from variously specified dates and tolled while
prisoners pursue state postconviction relief.59 Yet the basic provisions
do not specify with sufficient clarity when the clock starts ticking even
in ordinary cases, far less when it must be restarted in light of some
contingency (like newly discovered evidence or a newly hatched rule
of law). 60 The tolling provision, in its turn, fails to appreciate the
hosts of questions that arise with respect to the timing, duration, and
completion of state postconviction proceedings. In consequence, the
federal courts have been swamped with cases in which the sole or pri-
mary issue is neither more nor less than whether convicts got to the
church on time. Turn to the reports and you will be amazed at the
effort federal courts expend calculating habeas filing periods. The
Supreme Court has had to resolve conflicts among the circuits on
nine separate occasions, 61 and more problems are boiling up from the
circuit level. 62 This is an appalling state of affairs. Lots of business
competes for the attention of our federal courts, especially the Su-
preme Court. Meanwhile, the judges and justices are spending their
time not on the great constitutional questions of the day nor yet on
the merits of the claims advanced in habeas petitions, but rather on
57 See id. at 1738.
58 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(a) (authorizing dismissal "if it appears that the state of
which the respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the
petition"), quoted in Davis v. Adult Parole Auth., 610 F.2d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1979).
59 I suspect they had in mind death row prisoners who might deliberately postpone
federal litigation simply to defer the inevitable. I also suspect they distrusted federal judges
to exercise the authority granted by Rule 9(a) to dismiss tardy petitions in capital cases.
Both factual assumptions are contestable. If death row prisoners do not file federal peti-
tions as soon as some might like, it is usually because they lack counsel to marshal their
claims for effective presentation. I know of no empirical evidence suggesting that federal
judges failed to implement Rule 9(a).
60 See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 167-80 (2003) (surveying
the ambiguities regarding starting dates for the filing period).
61 Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S _ _, 125 S. Ct. 2562, 2566 (2005); Dodd v. United
States, 545 U.S. _, _, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 2481-82 (2005); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
.... 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811 (2005);Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S . -, 125 S.
Ct. 1571, 1577 (2005); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S_ ___. 125 S. Ct. 1528, 1533-34 (2005);
Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 526 (2003); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223-24
(2002); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 171-72 (2001); cf Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225,
230-32 (2004) (discussing yet another filing deadline problem).
62 E.g., Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 589 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing the debate
among inferior courtjudges over whether there is an "actual innocence" exception to the
filing period); Day v. Crosby, 391 F.3d 1192, 1194-95 (11th Cir. 2004) (identifying a divi-
sion among the circuits over whether the respondent forfeits a filing deadline argument by
failing to advance it in the answer), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 34 (2005) (No. 04-1324).
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the mechanics of procedural rules ostensibly meant to expedite fed-
eral litigation.
At this point, it is not enough to say (as I have) that federal
habeas corpus for state prisoners is an "intellectual disaster area."63
Everybody knows that. Nor is it helpful to insist (as I have) that we
should abandon everything that has been done regarding habeas
since Richard Nixon was elected and resurrect the Warren Court's ap-
proach. 64 Nobody thinks that is going to happen. Instead, we need to
take a deep breath, recognize the mess we have made of things, and
start over.
II
COMMON GROUND
No question, federal habeas corpus is intensely controversial.
Nevertheless, most observers share certain basic attitudes on which we
can build. First among these is the view that the enforcement of fed-
eral constitutional rights should not be left entirely to state courts.
These days, everyone endorses the Supreme Court's longstanding ap-
pellate jurisdiction to review state courtjudgments. 65 Concomitantly,
everyone recognizes that the Court is no longer a conventional court
of error with the duty and responsibility to catch and correct mistakes
of federal law made by courts below. 66 In part, the Court's modern
role is a product of the growth and development of American society.
There is too much federal legal business to do and too little time in
which to do it. This single tribunal sitting atop the judicial system
cannot manage the load. 67 More fundamentally, the Supreme Court's
mission has changed. We no longer expect the Court to exercise ordi-
nary appellate jurisdiction to do justice to the litigants, but rather to
use particular cases as vehicles for elaborating federal law according to
the needs of society at large.68 We allow the justices plenary discretion
to select the disputes they can best use to perform their function, and
we recruit inferior federal courts to see that the federal law the Court
articulates is followed in the run of ordinary cases. 69
63 Yackle, Figure, supra note 50, at 1756.
64 Id. at 1769-70.
65 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000).
66 See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five
Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000) (reviewing the history of the
Court's discretionary docket).
67 See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Fed-
eral and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1211, 1219-1220 (2004).
68 See Guido Calabresi, Madison Lecture, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable
Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1293, 1303 (2003) (explaining this evolution in judicial roles).
69 See id.
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Of course, the arrangements under which inferior federal courts
take up their duties are complex. Those courts have original jurisdic-
tion to resolve most civil disputes genuinely arising under federal
law.70 Yet state courts ordinarily have concurrent jurisdiction in the
same cases.71 By tradition, state courts and inferior federal courts are
coordinate equals operating in a single judicial system. Inferior fed-
eral courts have no appellate jurisdiction to review state court judg-
ments for error,72 and the Full Faith and Credit Statute typically
prevents them from considering issues that were or might have been
adjudicated previously in civil proceedings in state court.73 We have
developed a host of other quasi-constitutional norms, statutes, rules,
and common law doctrines to mitigate competition and friction be-
tween the two sets of courts contending, after a fashion, for the same
business.74 In all these ways, we prevent inferior federal courts from
routinely superintending the work of their state counterparts in civil
cases implicating federal law. 75
The arrangements for criminal cases ending in "custody" are dif-
ferent. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court neither can nor should re-
view state criminal judgments routinely, the inferior federal courts
take up the slack. This is the framework that Justice Frankfurter de-
scribed in Brown v. Allen76 more than a half century ago. At the time,
the only apparent statutory basis for inferior federal court jurisdiction
was habeas corpus. 77 So we massaged the writ into a general mecha-
nism for entertaining attacks on state criminal convictions and
sentences. This story, too, is familiar. We finessed the appellate flavor
of the inferior federal courts' role by insisting that habeas jurisdiction
is formally original in character,78 and we insisted that Congress had
exempted original jurisdiction in habeas from the Full Faith and
Credit Statute.7 9 The result was a generally available inferior federal
court jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state criminal
judgments.
70 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Federal Courts Study Committee reported widespread
agreement that this jurisdiction is appropriate. SeeJUDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 14 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE REPORT].
71 See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
72 See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
73 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75,
80-81 (1984).
74 See LARRY WAI. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 435-84 (2d ed. 2003).
75 See id. (surveying the abstention doctrines).
76 344 U.S. 443, 496-97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
77 See id. at 491.
78 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 407 (1963).
79 See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 n.27 (1982).
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You will say this framework is familiar, but hardly congenial to
everyone. You will say it was concocted by Justice Frankfurter in ser-
vice of his own vision for the Supreme Court's mission and that it was
exploited by the Warren Court in pursuit of a revolutionary agenda
for constitutional criminal procedure. You will say it confounded
principles of federalism, undermined crime control, and ultimately
produced the very backlash the Rehnquist Court's decisions and
AEDPA represent. You will say these things, but you will be right only
in part. Despite occasional academic and judicial critiques along
these lines, the basic Brown arrangements enjoy enduring and wide-
spread support.8 0 Justice Frankfurter purported to be implementing
the statutes then in place,81 and nobody has thought this familiar
framework defies congressional will.
In all the debates over the years, including those regarding
AEDPA, scarcely anyone has argued that inferior federal courts
should be denied the jurisdictional power they have enjoyed for so
long. Senator Hatch, the Republican floor leader during the AEDPA
debates, explicitly disclaimed any intention to eliminate habeas
corpus for state prisoners and marshaled the votes to defeat an
amendment that might have had that effect.8 2 Hatch insisted he was
committed to retaining habeas as a means of attacking state judg-
ments collaterally and wanted only to streamline and expedite the
processing of claims.83 He acknowledged that § 2254(d) would limit
federal court authority to displace state court decisions. Yet he main-
tained that his purpose was only to address cases in which the ques-
tion on the merits is close and, in those instances, to keep federal
judges from substituting their own judgment for that of state courts. 84
If we are agreed that inferior federal court jurisdiction is war-
ranted, we should be able to explain why. It is no answer that we
think federal courts are systematically better at enforcing federal
rights. Some of us think that is true, but there is no consensus about
it. The Supreme Court endorses the capacity of state courts at every
opportunity, subject to occasional exceptions that only serve to prove
the rule.8 5 But there is more to this than the old debate over "par-
80 See Yackle, Primer, supra note 4, at 427, 429.
81 Brown, 344 U.S. at 508.
82 141 CONG. REc. S7835-01 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see
Yackle, Primer, supra note 4, at 398-401.
83 See 141 CONG. Rac. S7835-01 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
84 See id.; Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed Re-
construction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CpuM. L. REv. 1, 62 (2002).
85 Compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976) (insisting that state courts
are perfectly competent to handle federal question business), with Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U.S .. .. 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340 (2005) (concluding that a state court had failed to
appreciate overwhelming evidence of race discrimination during voir dire in a capital
case).
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ity."8 6 I can think of two related explanations for federal court juris-
diction that have general appeal: We recognize that federal safeguards
are hard to enforce in the immediate context of criminal prosecu-
tions, and we acknowledge that state schemes for supplying counsel to
indigents are typically dissatisfying.
It is sometimes said that one purpose of criminal process is to
enforce procedural safeguards meant to ensure fairness.8 7 That claim
is misleading. The purpose of criminal process is to implement sub-
stantive criminal law policy by bringing that policy to bear on viola-
tors.88  Of course, violators have to be identified. Since most
procedural safeguards are linked to accurate fact-finding, there is a
way in which enforcing procedural rights is a necessary aspect of the
enterprise. But the purpose, the raison detre, of the criminal process is
to punish the guilty. Releasing the innocent is only a byproduct.
State judges charged to preside at criminal trials or to review judg-
ments are perforce participants in the project. They are also charged
to see that federal procedural safeguards are respected. Yet their abil-
ity to do so is compromised by the overriding mission to vindicate
state criminal law. This is an exaggeration, and I should qualify it in
obvious ways. But the general point is sound and telling. We gener-
ally think federal rights should not be left entirely to state courts be-
cause those courts have other plainly contradictory responsibilities.
Federal courts, by contrast, can concentrate on federal rights
unimpaired by any competing commitment to local criminal law.
This is the sentiment that moves us. We reserve the Supreme Court
for the formulation of abstract doctrine and rely on inferior federal
courts to supply the kind of independent second look we know in our
collective heart-of-hearts is required in run-of-the-mill cases.
We also know, at an equally deep level, that we have not been
faithful to Gideon v. Wainwright.8 9 States do not genuinely provide ef-
fective assistance of counsel or anything like it. The horror stories are
all too familiar. They do not depict isolated incidents, dreadful in
themselves but unrepresentative. Instead, they signal a general pat-
tern that is revealed with academic rigor when systematic studies are
conducted.9 0 Nor is the pattern limited to the southern reaches of
86 See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (coining the
phrase).
87 See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993
SuP. CT. REV. 65, 91-92.
88 See Yackle, Figure, supra note 50, at 1757-58.
89 See 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that
in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.").
90 See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BRO-
KEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004) [hereinafter
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE] (reporting a comprehensive study of the indigent defense sys-
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the country. Specialists decry the inadequate representation provided
to the poor,9' the Supreme Court laments it,92 the ABA condemns
it,93 and we all acknowledge it as an inescapable fact of legal life. The
most glaring deficiency is our failure to supply counsel willing and
able to investigate cases thoroughly, thus to uncover not only evidence
casting doubt on a defendant's guilt or mitigating the appropriate
sentence, but also circumstances supporting federal procedural argu-
ments. The extent of these problems is little abated by the knowledge
that even the legions of excellent lawyers doing criminal defense work
occasionally mishandle federal issues.
Our efforts to account for poor lawyering have failed. The Su-
preme Court has recognized that counsel error can constitute ineffec-
tive assistance in violation of the incorporated Sixth Amendment.94
Yet the Court has set the bar extremely low.95 Under the two-pronged
Strickland test, a prisoner must demonstrate both that counsel's per-
formance was beneath the level expected of professionals and that
counsel's mistakes were prejudicial.96 The reason the standard is so
forgiving is plain enough. We depend on defense lawyers both to
press their clients' rights and to make tactical decisions in their cli-
ents' interest, thus occasionally forgoing arguments or claims in an
effort to produce the best result. What may appear after the fact to
have been an oversight or mistake may actually have been part of a
plausible defense.97 It's hard to tell. The Strickland standard gives law-
yers the benefit of the doubt.98 Many of us would be less indulgent,
but none of us really wants a system that first tries criminal defendants
and then routinely tries their lawyers.
Moreover, the Court is convinced that we have to assume that
defense attorneys are on top of their game in order to justify enforc-
ing state procedural rules governing criminal cases.99 Those rules typ-
tem forty years after Gideon and concluding that "[c]learly, America has a long way to go to
deliver on Gideon's promise of effective legal representation for the poor," id. at ii), availa-
ble at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.
pdf; cf Yale Kamisar et al., Gideon at 40: Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the Promise, 41 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 135 (2004) (providing a retrospective discussion among Yale Kamisar, Abe Krash,
Anthony Lewis, and Ellen S. Podgor).
91 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawryer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
92 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (expressing dismay at counsel's fail-
ure to prepare any evidence in mitigation of a death sentence).
93 See, e.g., GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 90, at v-vii.
94 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 & n.11 (1984).
95 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-96 (1984);
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658.
96 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
97 See id. at 689.
98 See id. at 687-89.
99 See id. at 689-90.
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ically ask defendants (which is to say, their lawyers) to raise claims at a
specified time and in a specified manner on pain of forfeiture for de-
fault. The Court insists that federal courts must usually respond in the
same way, or else defense counsel will sandbag the state courts and
reserve federal claims for federal habeas later. 100 This, of course, is
where federal default doctrine in habeas cases comes into play.
Under the Court's decisions, a petitioner whose attorney failed to ad-
vance a claim seasonably in state court faces an uphill battle.' 10 If
counsel's default establishes an adequate and independent state pro-
cedural ground of decision that would foreclose direct review in the
Supreme Court, the prisoner can get a federal habeas court to look at
the claim only by demonstrating his probable innocence or by estab-
lishing both that the default should be excused for "cause" and that
he suffered "prejudice."10 2
Within this framework, the Court will not hear prisoners com-
plain that their lawyers committed default out of ignorance or neg-
lect. Attorney error does not ordinarily count as cause; something
"external to the defense" must have interfered with counsel's ability to
comply with state procedural rules.'0 3 Of course, if counsel's error
amounts to ineffective assistance in the constitutional sense, it can be
the basis for finding cause and thus (perhaps) reaching the merits of
the claim that counsel failed to raise.10 4 Herein, another reason for
making the Strickland standard so generous to lawyers. Were the con-
stitutional standard more demanding of defense counsel, prisoners
would find it easier to establish a constitutional violation and thus to
avoid the usual consequences of procedural default.
All this brings us to a troubling pass. Defense lawyers often fail to
advance federal claims as they should in state court, and, for that rea-
son, state courts refuse to consider them. We hesitate to allow federal
habeas courts to entertain claims that state courts declined to address,
but we know that we should permit them to do so in some circum-
stances. Otherwise, poor legal representation will combine with state
procedural rules to keep any court, federal or state, from reaching the
merits of potentially valid federal claims. So we put federal rules re-
garding the effect of default in state court together with Strickland and
hope the mix will produce acceptable results without too much
bother.
But it doesn't. Turn again to the reports and you will find exten-
sive opinions taken up with default questions. Typically, a federal
100 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977).
101 See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-96; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 86-87.
102 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
103 Id. at 488.
104 See id.
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habeas court must determine whether a state actually had a procedu-
ral rule requiring a federal claim to be raised in a particular way or at
a particular time, whether the prisoner violated such a rule, and
whether, if he did, the state courts did or would impose forfeiture of
the claim as a sanction. 105 Then there is the question whether a pur-
ported state ground of decision is adequate and independent, such
that it would cut off direct review in the Supreme Court. 10 6 If so,
there is a further question: whether the prisoner can establish cause
and prejudice or demonstrate that he is probably innocent. Along the
way, in many cases, the court must decide whether the default in issue
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel within the meaning of
Strickland, thus establishing both cause and an independent claim for
relief. All these tests are demanding for the reasons I just went
through. But enough prisoners manage to satisfy them to encourage
many more to make the attempt.
I know this brief account is cryptic, even cynical, and probably
unfair. But we're in a mess that we can't ignore. All I want to argue is
that these painful facts underlie the enduring idea that federal rights
implicated in criminal cases should not be left to state courts alone.
Those courts may answer in ordinary civil litigation when federal is-
sues emerge, but not when the safeguards drawn from the Bill of
Rights are at stake. In criminal cases, we need federal courts in the
wings, superintending state courts both when they determine the mer-
its of claims and when they refuse to reach the merits on procedural
grounds. The task, then, is to devise a better framework for getting
federal courts into the act where they can render effective service.
III
STARTING OVER
Once we resolve to try again, I want to suggest that we should not
assume that capital punishment will always be with us. You will say this
is a fool's errand. Federal habeas attacks on state criminal judgments
are inextricably linked with the death penalty. In many minds, sup-
port for the one necessarily entails opposition to the other. It is
largely because that is so that AEDPA exists as it does, and we can't
very well fix something by disregarding the reason it came to be bro-
ken. Nevertheless, I insist that we can set about establishing a better
105 See generally John H. Blume & Pamela A. Wilkins, Death by Default: State Procedural
Default Doctrine in Capital Cases, 50 S.C. L. REv. 1 (1998) (explaining how difficult it is to
avoid procedural default in state court).
106 That question, too, can be extraordinarily difficult. See generally Catherine T.
Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103
COLUm. L. REv. 243 (2003) (describing the need to undertake fact-sensitive adjudication
when it is necessary to decide whether the application of a state procedural rule in state
court resulted in an inadequate ground of decision).
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framework for allowing state convicts access to federal court only if we
forget for the moment that some of them are death row prisoners
hoping to evade execution. And if we set death penalty cases aside,
current concerns about granting significant power to individual fed-
eral judges should be reduced.
Consider three things. First, the death penalty is unlike the insti-
tutional characteristics of state court process or even the chronic fail-
ure to ensure competent lawyering in state court; it's not merely
another condition that demands accommodation. Capital punish-
ment is a corrupting force. It engenders resolute ideology where we
need flexible pragmatism, distrust where we need cooperation. And it
skews the criminal justice system in all manner of ways described in
the literature. 10 7 Second, the death penalty is a temporary distraction.
It need not influence a revised framework that will have real staying
power, because it has no staying power of its own. State-sponsored
homicide is a throwback, fighting the current of history. We came
ever so close to discarding it a half century ago, and there are signs
aplenty that we are about to finish the job.'0 8 Third, if we put the
death penalty out of our minds long enough to fashion a new frame-
work, we may find (and I think we will find) that we can develop ar-
rangements that make sense for noncapital and capital cases alike.
To begin, we should be willing to reconceptualize the structural
model in which federal adjudication fits. The "collateral" model we
have rests on the inferior federal courts' jurisdiction to entertain origi-
nal petitions for habeas corpus relief. Some academics, Barry Fried-
man and Jim Liebman among them, argue that it is more accurate to
regard habeas as an ersatz form of appellate review.t09 Dan Meador
once proposed that we should legislate an appellate model into exis-
tence, and Jordan Steiker has taken up that position as well (at least
107 See Hammel, supra note 84, at 17-32 (illustrating the many systemic problems that
petitioners face in capital cases);James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 2030, 2078-2136 (2000) (similarly detailing the institutional problems that inter-
fere with justice in capital cases); see also Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persis-
tent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209
(2004) (reporting that more than half of the death sentences imposed between 1973 and
1995 were dislodged for error on review in state or federal court).
I08 See Anna Badkhen, Pendulum Begins Swing Away from Death Penalty: "Culture of Life"
Agenda Pushes Advocates of Capital Punishment To Rethink Positions, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 10,
2005, at Al; Hal Dardick, Death Penalty Flaws Remain: Blagojevich, Panel in No Apparent Hurry,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 2005, at 1; Marc Humbert, N.Y. Legislators Kill Death Penalty Bill, Associ-
ATED PREss, Apr. 12, 2005, available at http://www.phillyburbs.com/pb-dyn/news/278-
04122005-475124.html.
109 See Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. RaV. 247 (1988); James S.
Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Par-
ity, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1997 (1992).
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for some cases). 1 0 The appellate model is attractive, both as a
description of what is and as a prescription for what might be. If infer-
ior federal courts were given authority to review state judgments di-
rectly, it would follow naturally enough that they would entertain
federal claims that were or might have been adjudicated in state court.
Moreover, since the inferior federal courts would be located in the
appellate conduit to the Supreme Court, they would be empowered to
consider claims grounded in new rules of law-claims foreclosed by
Teague under the current collateral model."II
I have always objected to the appellate model, only partly because
it would break the (admittedly weak) link to the Great Writ of Liberty.
It would also depart from the quasi-constitutional conception that
state courts and inferior federal courts are coequals forming the sides
of an elegant, symmetrical triangle with the Supreme Court at the
apex. Inferior federal courts would be elevated to a supervisory role
not only with respect to state trial courts, but also with respect to the
highest state appellate courts. Professor Meador hoped to defuse that
problem by channeling (some) appeals directly to the regional courts
of appeals rather than to federal district courts. 1 2 Professor Steiker
again follows suit. 3 But that answer is incomplete. Circuit courts,
too, are by tradition coordinate with state appellate courts. At all
events, simply shifting to a formal appellate model would not in itself
answer the serious questions we face. We would still need to specify
what deference federal courts should accord to state court determina-
tions on the merits and what federal courts should do if state courts
fail to adjudicate federal claims. Professor Meador answered those
questions, as does Professor Steiker, not as logical implications of the
appellate model, but rather as additional features of an appellate
program. 1 14
It's time for everyone to think again. I want to suggest that we lay
the two conventional models aside and confer on inferior federal
courts the functional authority they should have, sans any label and
the trappings a label would imply. If we need a name for purposes of
discussion, call this the hybrid model. Specifically, Congress should
confer jurisdiction on federal district courts to review judgments of
the highest state courts for errors of federal law-subject to review, in
110 See Daniel J. Meador, Straightening Out Federal Review of State Criminal Cases, 44 OHIO
ST. L.J. 273, 275-76 (1983); Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal
Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Procedural-
ism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 320-21. Professor Steiker limits his argument to death
penalty cases-the very cases I set aside.
111 Meador, supra note 110, at 278; Steiker, supra note 110, at 321-22.
112 Meador, supra note 110, at 278.
III Steiker, supra note 110, at 321-22.
114 Meador, supra note 110, at 278; Steiker, supra note 110, at 321-22.
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turn, by the circuit courts of appeals and, ultimately, by the Supreme
Court on certiorari. To be sure, jurisdiction of this kind would be
appellate in the sense that inferior federal courts would form a link in
the direct review chain from the initial state trial court to the Supreme
Court. But it need not bear the formal appellate designation, and it
can and should be limited in ways that distinguish it from the tradi-
tional power of a court of error. I do not propose that inferior federal
courts should oversee state courts in the orthodox sense of traditional
appellate review, which assumes that the next court in the appellate
line necessarily knows better than the last. I propose only that inferior
courts should act while state court judgments remain subject to Su-
preme Court review and thus are not final within the meaning of
Teague.115 I hasten to say that this innovation responds only to
Teague's ostensible concern that similarly situated petitioners be
treated in the same way. Under this plan, they would be.
The hybrid model should generally be substituted for habeas
corpus, which, in turn, should be foreclosed except in specially identi-
fied circumstances. Congress has done this sort of thing before. Fed-
eral convicts are obliged to employ motions to vacate sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and can rarely file habeas petitions to
attack federal convictions.11 6 The federal courts' jurisdiction in
habeas should be left in place, however, in order to be consulted on
those occasions when the hybrid model fails to account for all the
claims that may properly command federal adjudication. 17
Hybrid federal jurisdiction need not be available to every state
convict without regard to the gravity of his case. Under current law,
only prisoners in custody can petition for federal habeas relief. 18 The
custody requirement does not formally screen out all minor offenders.
Even misdemeanants can receive sentences to confinement, and some
may still be detained after state avenues for testing their claims have
been exhausted. In practice, however, the custody rule trims the field
down to convicts sentenced to substantial terms (or death). In the
past, I have argued that custody should not be a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite to federal adjudication. 1,9 I have to admit, though, that it seems
unrealistic to establish no threshold at all. And the alternatives that
come to mind are unattractive. If, for example, we were to specify that
only prisoners sentenced to a term of some minimum duration could
seek federal review, we would create incentives to impose sentences
115 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
116 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
117 Cf Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 380 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a
federal prisoner was entitled to proceed via habeas corpus in a rare instance in which
§ 2255 proved inadequate to test the validity of his sentence).
t18 See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989).
119 Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 1003-05 (1985).
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just short of that mark in order to forestall the very federal adjudica-
tion we want to establish. For now, then, I will live with the custody
doctrine as a tested, although imperfect, device for screening cases.
Hybrid jurisdiction should be conferred initially on the district
courts, not on the circuit courts of appeals. We get no conceptual
mileage out of bypassing the district courts; any scheme that gives cir-
cuit courts authority to review state judgments also departs from tradi-
tion. Relying on district courts in the first instance has practical
advantages as well. There will be occasions when federal hearings are
necessary and only district courts are equipped to conduct them. Pro-
fessor Meador made this point, 120 as does Professor Steiker.' 2 1 Under
Professor Steiker's plan, petitioners whose claims rest on facts outside
the appellate record should continue to seek federal relief through
habeas corpus petitions in the district courts.12 2 Professor Steiker thus
contemplates two routes-one directly to the circuit courts for claims
resting on the existing record and the other to district courts for
claims depending on facts outside that record.1 23 For my part, such a
scheme would be needlessly complicated and inefficient. The circuit
courts are already overflowing with cases and could not easily accom-
modate additional work moving directly from state courts. 124 If dis-
trict courts are first in line, the burden on circuit courts should be
significantly diminished (down, perhaps, to something approaching
the demands of current habeas appellate practice). District courts are
busy, too, but they already handle the run of entry-level habeas peti-
tions. And, of course, they are needed anyway for any fact finding that
needs to be done.
I don't mean to put this basic plan into precise statutory lan-
guage. For one thing, I have already confessed that I don't trust my-
self to do any better than the AEDPA drafters. For another, we are
more likely to reach agreement across ideological lines if the drafting
is done by a respected professional organization, such as the Ameri-
can Law Institute. I also set aside any concern about Congress's con-
stitutional power to orchestrate postconviction arrangements in this
way.125 But let me march (quickly) through the ways the hybrid
120 Meador, supra note 110, at 283.
121 Steiker, supra note 110, at 320-21.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 32 (1994) (explaining that circuit court docket loads are becoming
"intolerable"); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 109 (describ-
ing the overload as a "crisis").
125 For my own part, Congress's power to prescribe federal court jurisdiction should
bear most of the weight. Where state court practices are implicated, Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the Spending Clause should answer. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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framework would deal with the most important issues and problems in
view.
A. Review on the Merits
Take the most controversial issue first, that is, the deference in-
ferior federal courts should extend to previous state court judgments
on the merits of federal claims. Inasmuch as the federal courts would
review state decisions before they are final, the considerations that
gave rise to the Teague doctrine would be eliminated. All state prison-
ers would be treated alike. All would be free to advance whatever
claims they like, including claims that demand some adjustment in
federal law to be successful. On first blush, this may not sit well with
anyone concerned about aggressive federal judges second-guessing
state courts in marginal cases. Yet the only real departure from cur-
rent arrangements is that we would drop the pretense that Teague at-
tends to genuine changes in the content of federal rules of procedure.
Specifically, we would have done away with Teague's definition of a
new rule of federal procedural law-i.e., a result in a particular case
that departs from any reasonable result available at the time a case was
still in the direct review channel. 26 We ought to stop kidding our-
selves about that; we all know that Teague's definition of new rules is a
contrivance for curbing federal court consideration of the merits of
ordinary claims. We should discard Teague, then, as a limit on the
claims that federal courts can entertain.
This is not to say, however, that federal courts should ignore state
court decisions on the merits and, in Justice Jackson's phrase, ex-
amine federal claims entirely de novo.127 I have argued for that in the
past. 128 Professor Meador, too, thought entirely independent adjudi-
cation was appropriate, albeit he constructed his scheme on the pre-
mise that federal courts were already expected to provide that kind of
examination in habeas. 29 Here, for the sake of compromise, I sug-
gest that federal courts should determine only whether state court de-
cisions are reasonable. A federal court might conclude that a previous
state court judgment regarding a federal claim was erroneous. Yet
under the hybrid framework, the federal court would not be empow-
ered to overturn that judgment unless the state court was not only
wrong, but unreasonably wrong. This is the standard the Court has
read into § 2254(d), which now governs the availability of federal
habeas relief.130 It would also be the standard for federal court deci-
126 See supra text accompanying note 46.
127 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 546 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
128 See Yackle, Figure, supra note 50, at 1769-70.
129 Meador, supra note 110, at 274.
130 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000).
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sions on the merits of claims under a revised hybrid scheme.1 31 The
difference, again, is that Teague falls out of the picture and thus no
longer interferes with an honest, straightforward directive to federal
courts that they must not substitute their own judgment for that of
state courts in close cases.
The position would be altered if the Supreme Court were to se-
lect a particular case for further review. Under the hybrid model I
have in mind, the Court would not limit the scope of its own work in
the way inferior federal courts are restricted, but rather would elabo-
rate the law fully and accurately and thus sustain a state judgment only
if it is correct, not merely reasonable. This would entail procedural
moves that are unusual, but not really troubling. If a federal circuit
court overturned a state judgment for being unreasonably off the
mark, the state might seek Supreme Court review. The Supreme
Court, in that instance, would not determine whether the circuit court
reached the correct result regarding the question before it, but rather
would cut through to the underlying state court judgment (by hypoth-
esis against the prisoner) and determine whether that judgment was
not just reasonable, but correct. If the state court judgment was erro-
neous, the state still would lose. If a circuit court sustained a state
court judgment because it was reasonable (though perhaps not cor-
rect in the circuit court's eyes), the prisoner might seek Supreme
Court review. There again, the Court would look through the circuit
court decision and vindicate the correct result. Of course, in any case
in which the Supreme Court upheld a single prisoner's claim, there
might be other prisoners similarly situated whose cases should be re-
viewed in light of the new precedent. The Supreme Court would hold
cases like that on its docket until the new decision is rendered, then
vacate and remand to state court. GVR (grant, vacate, remand) prac-
tice is not fool proof, but it serves fairly well under the current system,
and nothing in the revised scheme I am describing would make it
more problematic.
B. The Exhaustion Doctrine
The hybrid model would largely secure the original purpose of
the exhaustion doctrine-namely, to prevent premature federal adju-
dication that disrupts pending state proceedings. 132 Federal court ju-
risdiction would not be triggered until a conviction is affirmed at the
131 I set aside the additional language in § 2254(d), allowing federal habeas relief if a
previous state court decision on the merits was "contrary to... clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court." Id. § 2254(d) (1). That part of the statute has
not done any work yet, and I am not sure what service it ever could provide. The drafters
probably had something in mind, but nothing that genuinely promotes clear thinking.
132 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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highest state appellate level. Yet the framework I have in mind would
discard the notion that prisoners should exhaust all available reme-
dies for the different purpose of giving state courts the first chance to
consider federal claims. To be concrete about it, prisoners would no
longer be required to pursue state postconviction relief in the wake of
appellate review. Small loss. State postconviction remedies have
never been anything to write home about. They were developed on
the theory that state courts might correct their own errors and thus
make federal habeas unnecessary. But they have proved to be more
trouble than they are worth, squandering everybody's time and ef-
fort. 133 Postconviction litigation, i.e., adjudication after the state ap-
pellate process is complete, largely should be a federal matter.134 This
is one way in which the hybrid model promises to make adjudication
more efficient.
Carving out state postconviction practice would make it easier to
write and enforce strict filing deadlines for federal proceedings. Nev-
ertheless, fixed time periods would still be problematic, and we can do
without them. Once we position inferior federal courts to immedi-
ately follow the highest state courts, we should be able to move cases
along by directing the lawyers concerned to perform their duties ex-
peditiously. If they don't, they (the lawyers) can be brought to heel.
Their clients need not suffer.
C. Procedural Default
The hybrid model should also offer a better means of contending
with procedural default in state court. Current doctrine forecloses po-
tentially meritorious claims without sufficient justification and diverts
resources into deciding why federal questions should not be enter-
tained. To be sure, the states have legitimate reasons for asking coun-
sel to raise issues at the proper time and in the proper manner, and it
will not do to open the federal courts so widely that incentives to com-
ply with local procedural rules disintegrate. But we have not managed
to find defensible middle ground. The essential choice is clear. Ei-
ther we should adjust default doctrine to make it easier for prisoners
to avoid procedural bar on the basis of counsel error, or we should
133 See generally Larry W. Yackle, The Misadventures of State Postconviction Remedies, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 359 (1987). While Andrew Hammel's reform program
would improve state postconviction practice immensely (in death penalty cases) and, on
that basis, would allow states to forestall federal adjudication thereafter, I have no faith in
that possibility. See Hammel, supra note 84, at 62.
134 I see no reason to bar states from making postconviction remedies available, either
while federal review progresses or later. After all, postconviction proceedings offer the
only means by which state courts can address federal claims that demand additional fact-
finding-including many ineffective assistance claims. And some prisoners may have state
law claims to advance. But the benefits of such state procedures are insufficient to warrant
accounting for them explicitly in the tighter scheme I am trying to construct.
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modify Strickland to make it easier for prisoners to demonstrate inef-
fective assistance (thus to establish both independent grounds for re-
lief and justification for entertaining claims that counsel failed to
pursue). Professor Steiker would moderate Strickland, but that would
mean an unlikely alteration in constitutional meaning. 135 We would
do better to set our sights on default doctrine-something Congress
can affect through legislation.
We have two problems. One is that the states can be madden-
ingly rigid with respect to procedural bar rules. Federal courts then
are forced to devote scarce resources to deciding whether a particular
rule, or its application, establishes an adequate and independent state
ground of decision and then, perhaps, actually to hold (to the state's
embarrassment) that state courts had no sufficient justification for
failing to reach the merits of a claim. 136 Moreover, state authorities
sometimes interfere with defense counsel's ability to assert federal
claims properly, thus forcing federal courts to find cause for de-
fault. 13 7 The other problem is that existing federal doctrine miscon-
ceives the typical reasons for default. Sandbagging is most unlikely.
Federal claims are overlooked in state court not because skilled coun-
sel (far less manipulative defendants) deliberately build error into
cases in hopes of upsetting convictions later. Instead, default is almost
always the product of counsel's poor investigation, ignorance, or
oversight.138
We need to strike a different balance. It is too late to revive the
Warren Court's rule and cut off claims only if prisoners themselves
deliberately fail to follow state procedural rules for strategic pur-
poses. 139 But we can return to practices that prevailed (or at least
were open) before the Rehnquist Court's decisions in the 1970s. At
that time, Justice White suggested that we distinguish between an in-
tentional decision by counsel to forgo the opportunity to advance a
claim in state court, on the one hand, and an unintentional failure to
135 See Steiker, supra note 110, at 319-21. Professor Steiker regards default doctrine as
the place where we should curb our desire for merits review. See id. He would prefer that
federal courts enforce state procedural default law as a tight, jurisdictional limitation on
federal adjudication. See id. at 321. That, it seems to me, is to move entirely in the wrong
direction. Current default doctrine needs to be more prisoner-friendly, not less.
136 See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 381 (2002) (finding inadequate a state court's
refusal to allow time to locate alibi witnesses because counsel had not complied with a local
rule requiring motions for continuance to be in writing).
137 See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999) (finding cause for defense
counsel's failure to request information from the prosecution because the state's attorney
had led counsel to believe there was nothing to disclose).
138 See generally Daniel Givelber, Litigating State Capital Cases While Preserving Federal Ques-
tions: Can It Be Done Successfully?, 29 ST. MARY's LJ. 1009 (1998) (explaining common rea-
sons for default).
139 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
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press a claim properly, on the other. 140 In his view, only deliberate
actions should result in the forfeiture of a later chance to litigate the
claim in federal court.141 Dan Meltzer once endorsed White's ap-
proach, albeit he (characteristically) explored a bevy of hard ques-
tions that would be implicated. 42 It seems to me, though, that if we
insist that only intentional defaults by counsel should count, we ap-
proach the Warren Court's "deliberate bypass" rule. 143 The only dif-
ference is that we would not demand that the prisoner himself
personally participate in counsel's deliberate tactic.
I am inclined to suggest that we preserve the Court's current rule
in the main, but make two changes. First, we should allow federal
courts to overlook default on a showing of "cause" alone, without de-
manding an independent demonstration of "prejudice." This ap-
proach, too, was open when the Rehnquist Court began. And even
today it is consistent with some of the language in Rule 12 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure-from which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist worked in the turning-point case, Davis v. United States.144 On its
face, Rule 12(e) authorizes federal courts to relieve defendants of the
consequences of default for "good cause."'145 There is no explicit
mention of "prejudice," and none has to be incorporated.
Second, the cause that warrants disregarding default should be
viewed from the federal court's perspective. This is to say, the court
should determine whether it has "good cause" for reaching the merits,
not whether the prisoner had cause for defaulting in the first place.
This change from current law would allow federal courts to rest find-
ings of cause on a range of considerations-including, but not limited
to, something "external" to the defense that prevented counsel from
offering claims in season. Certainly, good cause need not be entirely
independent of defense counsel error. The idea is to establish serious
incentives to advance claims in the proper manner, but then to allow
federal courts to make exceptions in their reasonable (and review-
able) discretion. Equally, cause should be found if it appears that an
innocent prisoner may have been convicted because he forfeited a
140 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 98-99 (1977) (White, J., concurring).
141 See id.
142 See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1128,
1215-20 (1986).
143 Noia, 372 U.S. at 438.
144 411 U.S. 233, 234, 241-43 (1973). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e) states
explicitly that a party "waives" claims by failing to advance them within the prescribed time.
FED. R. CpRM. P. 12(e). That's a poor way to put it. A waiver is characteristically a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent choice. Rule 12(e) actually contemplates that a party who de-
faults (intentionally or otherwise) will forfeit untimely claims. The hybrid framework I am
sketching would not simply foreclose claims that a party actually waives, but would also
exact forfeitures for default-subject always to the court's discretion to specify otherwise.
145 Id.
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claim on the basis of default. This kind of flexibility makes sense in
many other contexts where federal courts are given a similar discre-
tion, and it will serve admirably here as yet another aspect of the hy-
brid framework.
D. Counsel
I proceed from the premise that states will not provide effective
legal representation to indigents any time soon. The practical ques-
tion, then, is what can be done to compensate within the hybrid
framework for federal adjudication. It may seem that by installing the
federal courts in a kind of direct review channel, we must contemplate
that indigents would have a constitutional right to effective represen-
tation in federal proceedings-the very thing they are denied within
the current collateral model.1 46 That is not what I suggest. Under the
hybrid model, the opportunity for federal adjudication would not be
discretionary, but rather a matter of entitlement. But it does not fol-
low that a constitutional right to counsel would attach. I suggest only
that the federal government should supply counsel to indigents in hy-
brid proceedings as a matter of policy. I can't very well outline a really
good and workable new system without including professional repre-
sentation in the mix.
Counsel services might be administered in various ways. I want to
suggest that the lawyer who handled direct review in state court
should set things in motion by notifying the client that review in fed-
eral court is available, ascertaining whether the prisoner wishes to
press on, and, if so, filing an initial instrument in the appropriate fed-
eral district court. That instrument should set forth the federal claims
counsel thinks merit attention, the basics of the legal arguments, and
relevant portions of the record or other supporting materials. If
counsel despairs of any bona fide claims, she should file an Anders
brief.1 47 The district court, in turn, should appoint new counsel both
to develop the claims that state court counsel identified and to under-
take an independent investigation of the case-thus to explore any
other claims that may come to light. This last task is tricky. At a mini-
mum, counsel in federal proceedings must interview the client and
assess whether further field work is warranted. Yet there will be limits
146 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).
147 In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), the Court recognized that an attor-
ney appointed to represent an indigent on appeal may conclude that there are no viable
arguments to advance. In that event, the attorney may ask to withdraw, but only within a
procedural arrangement ensuring that the appellate court can determine that no nonfrivo-
lous claims are available. See id. In Anders itself, the Court held that it suffices for counsel
to file a brief identifying anything in the record that might form the basis for arguments on
appeal. See id.; cf Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272-74 (2000) (permitting states to
adopt alternative mechanisms for ensuring that nonfrivolous claims are not overlooked).
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to the additional investigation we can afford at this stage, and it may
be necessary for the court to monitor what counsel is about. Here,
too, if a lawyer comes up empty, she may give the district court an
Anders brief.
Of course, even if good lawyers are introduced to handle hybrid
federal proceedings, there is still the possibility that they, too, may
deliver ineffective service. Concomitantly, there is an argument that
we will need some further mechanism to review their performance
and perhaps to uncover claims that even this new system fails to iden-
tify. Yet in the interests of practicality, we should be satisfied with one
counseled trip through the inferior federal courts. We need not per-
mit disappointed prisoners to complain of ineffective assistance in hy-
brid proceedings. Under current law, we don't allow prisoners to
complain that habeas counsel was ineffective, and it isn't essential that
we should allow that kind of claim in a revised framework that is supe-
rior in so many other respects. 148
E. Multiple Federal Proceedings and New Rules
The matter of additional, second or successive, proceedings in
federal court goes beyond worries about effective representation.
However much we improve the quality of federal adjudication, there
will be occasions when potentially meritorious claims are overlooked
or inadequately developed-times, then, when even the most bitter
critics of federal jurisdiction would be willing to give prisoners an-
other bite at the apple. Notwithstanding the relentless criticism of
multiple petitions when AEDPA was under consideration, the enacted
statute still allows for second or successive habeas petitions. 149 Yet the
standards for multiple applications are so demanding that the enter-
prise is no longer worth the candle. For one thing, AEDPA is so skep-
tical of second or successive petitions that it requires prisoners to
obtain circuit court permission to file them at the district level. 150 Cir-
cuit screening, in turn, has become a boil on the system's backside,
which was hurting enough already. For another, the substantive stan-
dards that prisoners must meet are very nearly impossible to satisfy.
Truth is, we hold out the promise that circuit permission will be availa-
148 In my view, the country should have a robust, national federal public defender
program that employs, trains, and monitors career specialists and that routinely supplies
indigents in the federal courts with quality representation in any kind of serious proceed-
ing, including the proceedings I have in mind here. This is not the place to elaborate on
that idea.
149 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000).
150 See id. § 2244(b) (3).
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ble in some instances, but we really don't mean it.15 1 And then we
squander ever more resources in litigation that always concludes in
the same way: Prisoners are not allowed to return to the well. This is
where we almost certainly should make yet another compromise with
practicality. Once we ensure that prisoners have one (improved) op-
portunity to appear in federal court via the hybrid framework, we
should not allow them another.
Constructed this way, the hybrid scheme would not provide pris-
oners with a vehicle for pressing claims that rest on novel procedural
rules vital to the accurate determination of factual guilt. The Court
explained in Teague that everyone should have the benefit of genu-
inely basic procedural innovations-including convicts who present
their claims in habeas petitions. 152 Congress reinforced that idea in
AEDPA by specifying that some claims, defined in essentially the same
way, can be advanced in additional applications.1 53 In the event, how-
ever, no such innovations in procedure have emerged, and it frankly
appears that none will. Good arguments have been available in sev-
eral instances, but the conclusion has always been the same.' 54 It ap-
pears, then, that if the hybrid model absolutely foreclosed claims
grounded in novel rules so demonstrably crucial to accurate fact find-
ing, it would be no more inflexible than the scheme now in place-
only more honest.
Nor would the hybrid model allow for claims that are now suc-
cessfully advanced in second or successive habeas applications-
namely, claims that go to a state's constitutional authority to punish
or, at least, to punish in a particular way. The Court allowed for these
claims in Teague,155 though the Justices have since explained that
changes in substantive law are not properly understood to be of con-
cern to the Teague doctrine at all. 1 56 If, for example, it turns out that
the statute under which a prisoner was charged and convicted was it-
self constitutionally invalid, everyone would say that all prisoners af-
fected should benefit. And, for that, convicts who have already
employed the hybrid scheme to advance other claims require some
151 See generally Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in
Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 699 (2002) (providing a bill of
particulars).
152 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-13 (1989).
153 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2).
154 In Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 (2004), for example, the Court held that Mills
v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), announced a "new rule" that it is unconstitutional to
prevent a jury from considering circumstances not found unanimously to mitigate against
a death sentence. The Court allowed that the new Mills rule might be "laudable," but
concluded that it does not "fall within the second Teague exception." Beard, 542 U.S. at
420.
155 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
156 See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 & n.4 (2004).
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means of returning to court. Moreover, we might need some addi-
tional avenue by which at least one prisoner could press such a claim
as a sequel to review under the hybrid system in order to establish a
precedent on which others might rely.' 57 This judicial business is es-
sential, but it need not have a place in the hybrid framework itself. In
these important yet rare instances, we should allow prisoners to resort
to the writ of habeas corpus. 1 58
157 A relevant precedent might be established via the hybrid scheme, of course, but I
would hesitate to depend entirely on cases in that posture for this purpose.
158 It is more common that the Supreme Court gives a federal criminal statute an
unexpected interpretation, which triggers arguments that many previously convicted pris-
oners could not properly be found guilty. The Court insists that when it construes a statute
authoritatively, it does not change the statute's meaning, but only clarifies what it has al-
ways meant. Formalism aside, it is clear that something functionally new has occurred. In
those cases, too, we already rely on habeas corpus to provide the necessary procedural
vehicle. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 380 (2d Cir. 1997) (allowing a federal
convict to use habeas corpus in special circumstances where a motion pursuant to § 2255
was unavailable).
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